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HIS Article discusses selected cases reported during the 1995 Sur-
vey period' involving issues arising under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code adopted in Texas as the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. 2 Possible revisions of Articles 3 and 4 dealing with Commercial
Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections that may affect the decisions in
cases reported during the Survey period have also been noted.3 A few
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 are mentioned that
bear on secured transactions issues, but an extensive discussion of bank-
ruptcy goes beyond the scope of this Article. 4
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. THE REQUIREMENT THAT A CONTRACT CLAUSE BE
"CONSPICUOUS"
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.5 the Texas Supreme
Court announced that the Code definition of "conspicuous" in section
1.201(10) of the Code 6 would henceforth be applied to both Code and
non-Code cases to determine if a contract clause was or was not "conspic-
uous." 7 Dresser was followed during the Survey period in Allied Finance
Co. v. Rodriguez,8 a non-Code case, in which the court held that a clause
requiring the purchase of insurance from either the lender or from a third
party as part of a consumer credit transaction was not "conspicuous"
under the Code definition. 9 The failure to conspicuously disclose that
insurance could be purchased elsewhere led the consumers to buy cover-
age from the lender even though they already had insurance that would
1. A Survey period generally runs from October 1 of a given year through September
30 of the following year. Because of differences in timing for the release of opinions for
publication, motions for rehearing, and the like, a case may be included that was reported
shortly before or shortly after those dates, but the vast majority of cases discussed are
within that time frame.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 & 1994).
3. See text at note 168, infra.
4. See notes 226 and 227, infra.
5. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) defines
"conspicuous" in the following terms:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in
capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous.
Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other
contrasting type or color. Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not
is for decision by the court.
7. 853 S.W.2d at 509.
8. 869 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
9. Id. at 572. The clause in question appeared in a separate paragraph on the bottom
one-third of the consumer credit contract, but it was not set out in capitals or other distinc-
tive type so as to draw attention to it. The borrowers did separately initial this paragraph,
but the court attached no special significance to the initialing. Id.
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meet the loan requirements and this, in turn, resulted in a holding that
the lender had violated the Texas Consumer Credit Code. 10
B. ACCELERATION OF INSTRUMENTS
Texas law on the acceleration of instruments has involved three princi-
pal issues: (1) whether the proper method of acceleration outlined in the
Texas caselaw was followed," (2) whether there was an effective waiver
by the debtor of the right to insist that the creditor follow the rules estab-
lished by such caselaw, 12 and (3) whether the amount demanded upon
acceleration was usurious.13 In McLemore v. Pacific Southwest Bank,
FSB14 the court considered a situation that involved the first two of these
10. Id. The court affirmed a ruling by the lower court assessing a $2,000 penalty
against the lender for the Credit Code violation as well as attorney's fees and interest in
the amount of $2,000. Because the transaction in question arose before various amend-
ments to the Credit Code were enacted in 1993, the sections of the Credit Code involved in
this decision were TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-3.18(3) & -8.01(b) (Vernon 1987
& Supp. 1993), which provided for an automatic penalty of $2,000 for violations like the
one in question. The penalty provisions in TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(b)
were modified in the 1993 legislative session to provide for the recovery of (1) an amount
not to exceed three times the amount of the actual economic loss (in Allied this would
seem to be an amount not exceeding three times the cost of the excess insurance coverage
for a total penalty of $161.03 x 3, or $483.09), or, alternatively, (2) an amount not in excess
of two times the amount of all credit charges, but with a maximum limit of $2,000 or $4,000
depending upon the amount financed (the court did not specify the total amount of the
credit charges in Allied, but the total loan amount was $3,382.26; at even a relatively mod-
est interest rate, twice the amount of the credit charges would probably exceed three times
the cost of the insurance). The revised art. 8.01(b) does not state whether the borrower,
the lender, the court, or the jury is to make the election between the penalties stated in the
section. In any event, the revised provision would result in the recovery of lesser penalties
than those assessed under the earlier statutory language applied in Allied, but would not
affect the holding that the conspicuousness of the insurance clause was to be measured
against the Code standards.
11. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982) (unless waived,
proper acceleration requires presentment, followed by notice of the intent to accelerate
and by notice of the acceleration itself); Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815
(Tex. App.-Amarillo, 1985 no writ) (same); Bodiford v. Parker, 651 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ) (same).
12. In Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1991) the Texas
Supreme Court held that "a waiver provision must state specifically and separately the
rights surrendered." A further discussion of Shumway and an example of a waiver clause
appears in JOHN KRAHMER, KARL VANCIL & ROBERT WOOD, TEXAS COMMERCIAL LAW
FOR BANK LAWYERS 298-300 (3d ed. 1994).
13. In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schueneman, 668 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1984) the Texas
Supreme Court acknowledged this problem in the following terms: "In literally scores of
cases, the courts of this state have been called upon to decide whether a contract is usuri-
ous because it contains an acceleration provision which allows the collection of unearned
interest or finance charges." Id. at 333 n.6. The court went on to suggest the use of savings
clauses to disavow any usurious intent when a note is accelerated and excess interest is
inadvertently demanded. lid Such savings clauses have since been upheld in a variety of
circumstances, See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521,
525-26 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ) (savings clause effectively disclaimed intent to
charge usurious interest and permitted prepayment penalty to be upheld); First State Bank
v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (savings clause effective to
cap interest rate at maximum lawful rate although escalation clause allowed theoretically
unlimited interest); Myles v. RTC, 787 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ)
(plain English savings clause upheld in acceleration of note).
14. 872 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
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three issues. Using a mix-and-match analysis, the court held that, while
the language used in a note was sufficient to waive the requirement of a
demand for payment and the requirement of a notice of intent to acceler-
ate, it was not sufficient to waive the separate requirement of a notice of
the acceleration itself.15 The court further held that three notice letters
sent to the debtor were merely notices of intent to accelerate, a notice
requirement that had already been waived, and did not give the debtor
proper notice of acceleration. 16 Fortunately for the creditor, however,
the court ruled that notice of an intent to accelerate, followed by notice
of the date and time scheduled for the foreclosure sale and notice of the
completed sale of the property, was sufficient to constitute notice of the
actual acceleration. 17
The question of effective waiver took a new turn in Rey v. Acosta' 8
because of the amendment to the Texas Property Code in 1987 requiring
that, in a residential loan transaction, "[n]otwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary," the debtor be given notice of default and at least twenty
days to cure the default prior to acceleration.19 The issue before the
court was whether this amendment could be applied retroactively to
modify waivers contained in residential loan agreements entered into
before the effective date of the amendment. 20 The court held that state
constitutional restrictions prohibiting retroactive application of new laws
and prohibiting the impairment of contracts applied only to vested rights
and not to the modification of a remedy.21 Because the amendment did
not abolish the right to accelerate, but merely imposed a requirement of
written notice and a prescribed grace period, the court viewed the revised
statute as remedial legislation rather than a constitutionally impermissi-
ble impairment of any constitutionally protected substantive rights avail-
able to the creditor.2 2 Because the creditor failed to give a notice of
acceleration and a cure period that complied with the statutory require-
ments, the attempted acceleration was held to be improper and only the
missed installments could be recovered rather than the entire balance of
the loan.23 The court also pointed out the improper attempt to accelerate
15. Id. at 291.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 292. On this point the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had de-
clined to decide this issue on the facts presented in Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640
S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982), but believed it reasonable to infer that such a sequence of events
would constitute effective notice of acceleration. Id.
18. 860 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
19. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Supp. 1995) was amended by adding the
notice requirement and the 20-day cure period in a new subsection (d) during the 1987
legislative session.
20. 860 S.W.2d at 656. The amendment took effect on January 1, 1988. Id.
21. Id. at 657. The constitutional restrictions appear in TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
22. Id. at 658.
23. Id. at 658-59. The borrowers remained in possession of the property, but ceased
making any payments following receipt of the improper notice of acceleration which de-
manded payment of the entire balance. The court noted that the creditor was entitled to
recover for all of the unpaid installments that had accumulated during the past 5 years plus
interest at the rate provided in the note. Id.
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violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)24 and the Debt Col-
lection Practices Act 25 as a matter of law. The case was remanded for
entry of judgment on the creditor's claim in the amount of the past due
installments and for the determination of damages on the borrowers'
DTPA and debt collection practices counterclaims.26
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. CONTRACT FORMATION AND INTERPRETATION
Section 2.207 of the Code is a statutory attempt to reject the common
law "mirror image rule" in favor of a more pragmatic approach to the
realities of contracting in a business environment.27 Although criticized
as inadequate for the task,28 it does provide the courts with a degree of
flexibility in dealing with cases where the parties have dealt with each
other as if they have a contract despite the uncertainty that results when a
later analysis of the forms, letters, or other communications leaves one in
doubt as to exactly what the terms of the contract were supposed to be.29
In Howell Crude Oil Co. v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp.30 the parties disagreed
about whether compulsory arbitration was required in a transaction in-
volving the sale of natural gas. One party contended arbitration was re-
quired under a contract between the parties. The other argued that no
contract had been formed because the documents they exchanged did not
contain identical cancellation provisions. The court reviewed the various
documents and determined that, despite differences in the cancellation
provisions proposed by the two parties in their writings, they had dealt
with each other as if they had a contract. 31. Under these circumstances,
the court held that a contract had been formed and that it included an
arbitration clause on which the exchanged documents agreed and entered
an order compelling arbitration.32
24. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.565 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
Although not mentioned by the court in its opinion, the specific provision that seems to be
the most likely to have been violated is TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
25. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to 5069-11.11 (Vernon 1987).
26. 860 S.W.2d at 659. As to damages on the DTPA and Debt Collection Practices
Act claims, the court noted that "[plroof of any compensable damages may prove elusive"
on the facts of the case since the debtors were not deprived of the property during the
pendency of the litigation and made no payments for over years.
27. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
28. See, e.g., JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(PRACTITIONER'S EDITION) §§ 1-3 (3d ed. 1988).
29. One of the most extensive discussions in the Texas cases applying TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) is Westech Eng'g, Inc. v. Clearwater
Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
30. 860 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
31. I& at 637.
32. Id. at 639. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994)
provides:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suffi-
cient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
1995]
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In Axelson, Inc. v. McEvoy-Willis33 the dispute centered on the cancel-
lation term itself, with the seller insisting a contract had been formed that
included a term limiting the right to cancel as contained in the seller's
quotation form, and with the buyer insisting it was free to cancel as per its
own cancellation provision. Characterizing the case as one sounding
"like the delight of a contracts professor, if no one else,"34 the court held
that the buyer had accepted the offer contained in the seller's quotation
before sending its own proposed cancellation term.35 The court further
held that a contract had been formed either on the seller's terms or, if the
exchanged writings did not create a contract, the conduct of the parties
recognized the existence of a contract and, under the Code, the buyer's
attempted cancellation constituted a breach.36
The court took a different approach to the issue of contract formation
in Gasmark, Ltd. v. Kimball Energy Corp.37 In Gasmark both parties
initialed a provision that their negotiations were subject to the "execution
of a mutually agreed formal contract. ' 38 Discussion between the parties
proceeded through conversations and the exchange of documents from
late November to mid-February when one of the parties terminated the
negotiations. Although the buyer purchased gas from the seller from De-
cember to February while negotiations proceeded, the court did not re-
gard this as conduct recognizing the existence of a contract because of the
agreement to be bound only upon execution of a formal contract. This
agreement, according to the court, subjected the negotiations to the
"common-law requirements of a formal offer and acceptance. .... -39
Since the parties never executed a formal agreement, the court held the
negotiations remained preliminary and never resulted in the formation of
a binding contract.40
Rejection of the common law mirror image rule was not the only
change made by the Code in attempting to reconcile the law of sales with
business practice. Another innovation was the explicit approval of output
and requirement contracts, issues which caused problems at common law
because they are inherently indefinite.41 In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sion of this title.
33. 7 F.3d 1230 (5th Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 1231.
35. Id. at 1233.
36. Id. The court cited TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.703 & 2.708 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994) in support of the proposition that, absent a contractual right to cancel, the
buyer's refusal to accept and pay for the goods was a breach of the contract.
37. 868 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, n.w.h.).
38. Id. at 927.
39. Id. at 928.
40. Id
41. Official Comment 2 to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994) notes, "Under this Article, a contract for output or requirements is not too




Lenape Resources Corp.4 2 the court determined that an agreement for
the purchase and sale of natural gas was an output contract because the
precise quantity was not specifically stated but varied in accordance with
the seller's production and delivery capacity. A major issue in the case,
however, was whether the seller had intentionally increased production
to take undue advantage of the buyer under a "take or pay" clause in the
contract. 43 On this issue, the court reviewed the terms of the agreement
in light of the provisions of section 2.306 of the Code" and held that the
seller could increase production only within the limits of reasonableness
and good faith.45 In reaching this conclusion the court distinguished an
earlier Texas Supreme Court decision 46 holding that an implied obliga-
tion of good faith could not vary the terms of a written agreement. 47 On
this issue the court remanded the case for trial on whether the seller had
merely expanded production reasonably and in good faith, or whether the
seller had expanded production to take bad faith advantage of the take or
pay clause.48
B. WARRANTIES
An occasional case arises that permits a court to review multiple theo-
ries of liability based on a single set of facts and to write an opinion that
resembles a legal mini-treatise. One such case is Crosbyton Seed Co. v.
Mechura Farms.49 To obtain sorghum seed for the 1990 growing season,
Mechura Farms, a family farming partnership, purchased a large quantity
of seed through a seed broker. The seed itself was obtained through the
Crosbyton Seed Company and, prior to delivery to Mechura Farms, it was
treated with chemicals designed to protect the seed against the effects of
herbicide. Soon after planting, the crop showed signs of poor germina-
tion and damaged plants. At the Mechuras' request, a number of persons
inspected the crop in the field at various times during the growing season
and, when the crop was finally harvested, the yield was below that for
other seed varieties planted by the Mechuras on other acreage.
In an action against the three seed companies and the two chemical
companies involved in the distribution chain, the Mechuras alleged a vari-
ety of claims: negligence, strict liability, breach of contract, breach of ex-
press warranty, breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, and DTPA
misrepresentations. The two chemical companies settled with the plain-
tiffs before trial and the case proceeded against the seed companies. In
42. 870 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ granted).
43. A "take or pay" clause is common in contracts for the sale and purchase of natural
gas. Under such a clause a buyer must either take or pay for any gas the seller has avail-
able for delivery whether or not the buyer has any actual need for the gas at a given time.
44. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
45. 870 S.W.2d at 294.
46. Exxon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co, 678 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1984).
47. 870 S.W.2d at 293.
48. Id. at 294.
49. 875 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
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an instructive opinion, the court discussed the plaintiffs' interrelated the-
ories on two levels: first, whether the theory of liability was valid under
existing Texas law and, second, whether the evidence supported recovery
under those theories determined to be valid.
As to the several theories of liability, the court made the following
determinations:
1. Negligence
Based on the decision in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLan-
ney,50 a cause of action for negligence to recover for economic loss only
would not lie because there was no showing that the defendants' conduct
would give rise to liability independent of the contract; absent the con-
tract, there was no separate common law duty owed by the defendants to
the plaintiff.51
2. Strict Liability
Under existing Texas law, the theory of strict liability requires physical
harm to persons or property; economic loss alone will not support recov-
ery on a strict liability claim and the plaintiffs did not allege any physical
harm caused by the seed or by the chemicals applied to it.52
3. Breach of Contract
There was no evidence to support a breach of contract claim because,
although the yield was below that of other seed varieties, the seed did
produce a yield that was above the average yield in the same county in
1990 and that was also above the ten-year average yield for Mechura
Farms. The contract did not call for the seed to produce either a specific
yield or a comparative yield.
4. Express Warranty
As to express warranties, the court recognized some conflict in Texas
law on the issue of whether privity of contract is required to enforce ex-
press warranties when only economic loss is involved.5 3 The bag tags on
the seed purchased by the Mechuras claimed a germination rate of
eighty-five percent and a purity of ninety-nine percent. Because all of the
sellers in the distribution chain were aware that the Mechuras would be
50. 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991).
51. Crosbyton Seed, 875 S.W.2d at 360.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 361. The conflicting decisions noted by the court were Nat'l Bugmobiles,
Inc. v. Jodi Properties, 773 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied)
(privity not required where exterminator made a perpetual, transferable express written
warranty knowing that house might eventually be sold); Texas Processed Plastics v. Gray
Enter., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-'Iyler 1979, no writ) (privity required to
enforce an express warranty against a remote manufacturer); and Clarostat Mfg., Inc. v.
Alcor Aviation, Inc., 544 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(privity not required where manufacturer made express warranties directly to buyer).
[Vol. 48
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receiving at least part of the seed lot in question, the court held that the
representations on the bag tags could constitute express warranties run-
ning to the ultimate purchasers whether or not the sellers were in direct
privity with them. 54 The seed broker through whom the seed was
purchased was also alleged to have made representations that could be
construed as express warranties of quality going beyond mere opinion or
commendation. 55 On the evidentiary level, there was some evidence
showing a germination rate of less than eighty-five percent. There was no
evidence, however, that the seed was less than ninety-nine percent pure.
The court concluded that an express warranty claim would lie against all
of the defendants for the representation of eighty-five percent germina-
tion and against the seed broker for his alleged representations, but there
was no evidence to support a breach of express warranty as to the purity
of the seed.
5. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
In a careful review of this often-misunderstood warranty, the court cor-
rectly noted that this warranty only arises when the buyer has a particular
purpose for the use of the goods. Because there was no evidence that the
buyer intended using the seed for anything other than its ordinary pur-
pose of growing a grain sorghum crop, the court held that no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arose on the facts of the
case.56
6. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
The court recognized that Texas law does not require privity of contract
for the recovery of purely economic loss on a breach of implied warranty
of merchantability theory.57 The court also acknowledged that, under
Texas law, to prove that goods are not fit for their ordinary purpose the
plaintiff must show the goods are defective because of the "lack of some-
thing necessary for adequacy. '58 Because there was no disclaimer of this
warranty by any of the defendants, and because there was some evidence
tending to show that the seed was defective, the court held this was a
viable theory of liability.59
54. Crosbyton Seed, 875 S.W.2d at 361-62.
55. Id. at 362. The Mechuras were, of course, in direct privity with the seed broker so
there was no privity issue in regard to these alleged representations.
56. On this point the court correctly noted, "This is the stuff of which a claim for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is made .. " 875 S.W.2d at 365 n.10.
57. Il at 363 (citing Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80-82
(1977)).
58. 875 S.W.2d at 363 (citing Plas-Tex, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d
442, 443 (Tex. 1989) in which this requirement was announced).




Curiously enough, in asserting their DTPA claims, the plaintiffs did not
allege a DTPA violation based on breach of warranty, but chose, instead,
to limit these claims to misrepresentations about the seed.60 In a lengthy
review of the evidence on the DTPA claims, the court concluded that,
while the theory was potentially valid, there was insufficient evidence to
support a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs based on alleged misrepresenta-
tions concerning chemical application and germination. 61
The net result of the court's analysis resulted in judgments against the
plaintiffs on the theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of contract,
breach of an express warranty of purity, breach of an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose and DTPA claims for misrepresentation. 62
A new trial was ordered, however, on the theories of an express warranty
of the germination rate and on any express warranties made by the seed
broker, on the claim for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability, and on the DTPA claim based on the germination rate
representation. 63 The court also reversed and remanded an associated
counterclaim by the defendants to recover the balance due on the price of
the seed because of erroneous jury instructions regarding the deduction
of such recovery on the counterclaim from any damages found in favor of
the plaintiff.64
C. REMEDIES
Another warranty case involving claims of negligence and breach of
implied warranty was Hininger v. Case Corp.,65 where the plaintiff sued a
component supplier for lost profits resulting from the failure of four com-
bines to work properly due to apparent defects in the drive wheels manu-
factured by the component supplier.6 6 Reviewing the same principal
cases discussed in Crosbyton Seed,67 the court reached an identical con-
clusion that damages for economic loss alone could not be recovered
60. Id. at 365. Recovery under the DTPA can be based on claims for misrepresenta-
tion or for breach of warranty claims. As to these claims, see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.50(a)(1) & (a)(2) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995), respectively.
61. 875 S.W.2d at 367-71. In its review of the evidence, the court placed great reliance
on Texas Department of Agriculture testing and regulations indicating that the germina-
tion rate had not been misrepresented by the defendants. Id. at 370-71.
62. Id. at 372.
63. Id. at 372-73.
64. Id. Because several of the issues had to be retried, proper treatment of any recov-
ery on the counterclaim had to await determination of the plaintiffs' right to recover on the
various theories of liability, including the possible recovery of attorney's fees on the DTPA
claim.
65. 23 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 131 (Jan. 9, 1995).
66. Id. The other defendants originally included the combine manufacturer, the sell-
ing dealer, and the lender who had financed the purchase. All of these parties settled and
only the component supplier remained in the litigation as a party defendant.
67. Crosbyton Seed Co. v. Mechura Farms, 875 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, n.w.h.), discussed in text at note 49, supra. The principal cases discussed in
both opinions were Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991)
and Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
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under Texas law on a theory of negligence against either the combine
manufacturer or the component supplier.68 On the implied warranty is-
sue, the court recognized that a lack of privity is not a bar to the recovery
of economic loss because of a breach of warranty asserted by a purchaser
against a remote manufacturer. 69 In this case, however, the purchaser
was attempting to assert liability against a component supplier who had
supplied parts to the actual manufacturer of the finished goods. The
court found no Texas authority directly in point on whether an implied
warranty claim for economic loss would lie against the manufacturer of a
component part.70 Lacking direct authority, the court reasoned that the
policy underlying the rejection of a privity requirement in Texas was be-
cause a manufacturer could always restrict liability for economic loss by
making appropriate disclaimers of warranty or limitations of remedy.71
At the same time, however, the court noted that Texas law disallows the
recovery of economic loss on a theory of strict liability to protect manu-
facturers from "unlimited and unforeseeable liability. '72 Applying these
underlying policies to the facts of the case before it, the court believed
that component suppliers would not be able to effectively disclaim war-
ranties because their components simply become part of another product
and any disclaimer may never be communicated to the ultimate pur-
chaser of the finished product.73 The court concluded, therefore, that
Texas "would distinguish between the manufacturer of the finished prod-
uct and the component supplier because of the component supplier's in-
ability to disclaim its warranty liability effectively" and denied recovery
on the implied warranty theory because of a lack of privity.74
While the court's rationale seems facially persuasive, it is not an en-
tirely satisfactory explanation of why a lack of privity should deny the
ultimate purchaser a direct claim against a component supplier. An ex-
cellent example illustrating the problems with the court's reasoning oc-
curred in November of 1994 when it was announced that approximately
two million of the first Pentium computer chips manufactured by Intel
Corp. and delivered to computer manufacturers had a defective floating
point calculating unit (a specialized mathematics processing part of the
chip). Because of this defect, certain computations generate incorrect
results. Intel Corp. acknowledged the defect, but also reported that the
errors might result in only approximately one in nine billion division cal-
culations. A reported example of the error, however, might lead one to
believe that the frequency is somewhat higher. According to one article,
an example of the error was generated by using the Microsoft "Excel"
spreadsheet software: Taking the number 4195835 and first multiplying it
68. 23 F.3d at 127.








by 3145727, then dividing it by the same number, gave a result of 4195579
instead of the expected correct result of 4195835.75 The correct result was
obtained using the same Excel software on a computer that used an 80486
chip that was also manufactured by Intel Corp. instead of a Pentium
chip 76
From a legal standpoint, there are at least three intriguing aspects
about this example. First, Intel Corp. had previously engaged in an ex-
tensive advertising campaign to promote the use by computer manufac-
turers of a stylized logo consisting of a circle with the words "Intel Inside"
written inside the circle and encouraging purchasers to look for this logo
when making computer purchases. In this instance, Intel Corp. was hardly
an unknown component supplier, but an aggressive marketer intention-
ally seeking to promote the use of its brand of computer chip to computer
manufacturers and end users. This certainly differs from the component
supplier who cannot effectively communicate a warranty disclaimer to the
ultimate purchaser. Second, if a purchaser sues a computer manufacturer
for breach of warranty, the manufacturer may have a claim over against
Intel Corp. under section 2.607 of the Code.77 Is it legally sound to deny
the purchaser the right to proceed directly against the manufacturer of
the faulty computer chip? Considered in this light, the court's rationale
seems incorrect even in the case of an unknown component supplier.
Third, there is some indication that Intel Corp. was aware of the defect in
the chip as early as July of 1994. Although the defect was apparently cor-
rected at about that time, Intel Corp. did not acknowledge the defect
until it was generally reported from other sources in November of 1994.78
Some purchasers may have DTPA claims because of this delay in making
information about the error available. 79
As a Fifth Circuit case attempting to predict Texas law in the absence
of direct authority, Hininger v. Case Corp.80 should not be accepted too
literally, but should be critically examined to see if its reasoning is a
proper analysis of the Texas caselaw on implied warranties, privity, and
economic loss.
One of the difficulties facing a disappointed buyer when the seller fails
to deliver the goods called for under a contract of sale is the need to
prove market price if the buyer sues under the standard damage formula
allowing recovery of the difference between the contract price and the
market price.8' The remedy of "cover" in section 2.712 of the Code pro-
75. IrNOWORLD, Vol. 16, No. 48 at 1, 18 (Nov. 28, 1994).
76. Id.
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
78. A separate article in the same issue of Infoworld reports this scenario. IN-
FOWORLD, Vol. 16, No. 48 at 130 (Nov. 28, 1994).
79. The claims could be based on either breach of warranty claims or on laundry list
violations under TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46 & 17.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994).
80. 23 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 131 (Jan. 9, 1995).
81. Calculating expectation damages based on the contract/market differential is a
standard common law remedy as well as one of the remedies provided under the Code.
[Vol. 48
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
vides a buyer with a useful alternative to the difficulties of proving mar-
ket price.82 This remedy allows a buyer to purchase goods in substitution
for the goods the buyer failed to receive under the contract and sue -for
the difference between the contract price and the cover price. To avoid
abuse of this remedy, the Code requires the cover purchase to be made in
good faith and without unreasonable delay.83 In Mueller v. McGill8 the
court correctly held that the good faith and reasonableness of a buyer's
cover purchase were questions of fact raising a "'classic jury issue.' "85
The court reached this conclusion even though the substitute purchase
was for a 1986 model Porsche and the original contract was for a 1985
model. The court noted that the Code allows reasonable substitution
when identical goods are not available and that the evidence showed
great difficulty, if not impossibility, in finding a 1985 model as a
substitute.86
D. LIMITATION OF AcrIONS
The statute of limitations for breach of a sales contract is four years
from the time the cause of action accrues.87 A cause of action for breach
of warranty accrues upon tender of delivery of the goods unless the war-
ranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the g6ods.88 Ac-
cording to the Texas Supreme Court, in construing a warranty to
determine if it extends to future performance so as to extend the limita-
tions period, emphasis must be placed on the word "explicitly. '8 9 This
rule of construction was 'followed in Kline v. U.S. Marine Corp.,90 where
the court held that a warranty on a boat motor covering "failures by de-
fects in material and workmanship" for twelve months after the date of
sale did not explicitly extend to the future performance of the goods
themselves, but only stated the buyer's remedy if the goods suffered a
failure due to defects in material or workmanship during the first year
following the purchase. 91
The buyer in Kline also alleged a breach of the common law implied
warranty of good and workmanlike repair that was judicially adopted in
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 902-04 (2d ed. 1990). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.713 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) contains the Code statement of this formula.
82. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
83. Id. § 2.712(a).
84. 870 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
85. Id. at 676 (quoting from American Carpet Mills, Etc. v. Gunny Corp., 649 F.2d
1056 (5th Cir. 1981)).
86. Id.
87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994),
88. Id. § 2.725(b).
89. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. 1986) (ques-
tion of fact presented whether express warranty that roofing material was "bondable up to
20 years" was an explicit reference to future performance).
90. 882 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]. 1994, writ denied).
91. Id. at 600.
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Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes.92 On this issue, the court
properly held that the focus of the warranty is not on the result of the
repairs that are done, but on the manner in which the repairs are done. 93
The work in question was done by the dealer which had originally sold
the motor to the buyer, by other dealers, and by the manufacturer itself.
The attempts to repair extended over a substantial period of time and
much of the work was done without charge even though the original
twelve-month warranty covering parts and labor had expired. There was
no expert testimony challenging the manner in which the work was done,
and even the buyer testified that he had come to believe " 'that the prob-
lem exists with the motor itself, not with the services that are being per-
formed on the motor.' "-94 Because the evidence failed to show that the
repairs were not done in a good and workmanlike manner, the court ren-




Prior to 1990, the Official Text of Article 3 of the Code was entitled
"Commercial Paper" and covered issues associated with checks, drafts,
notes, and other forms of paper used to evidence debts or to make pay-
ments. In 1990, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute approved a new Official Text
for Article 3 and retitled the article as "Negotiable Instruments. ' '96 The
general coverage remained the same. At the same time, extensive revi-
sions were also approved in the Official Text of Article 4 of the Code
covering issues arising in the bank collection and payment process, but
the title of Article 4, "Bank Deposits and Collections," was not changed.
The pre-1990 Official Text of Articles 3 and 4 was adopted in Texas in
1966 with very few modifications and became Chapters 3 and 4 in the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 97 During the period covered by
this Survey, the pre-1990 Official Text was in effect for the cases discussed
in this article, but the reader should be alert to the distinct possibility that
the 1990 Official Text will be adopted during the 1995 Texas legislative
session and may affect the precedential value of cases decided under the
prior version of Articles 3 and 4 of the Code. This article will occasion-
92. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). In Melody the court held that contracts to repair or
modify tangible goods or property carry with them an implied warranty that the repair or
modification will be done in a good and workmanlike manner.
93. Kline, 882 S.W.2d at 600.
94. Id at 601.
95. Id.
96. The 1990 revision of the Code will hereinafter be cited as Rev. U.C.C. § 0-000
(1990).
97. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.101-3.805 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) & TEx.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.101-4.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
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ally refer to the 1990 Official Text as it bears on the issues raised in the
cases discussed.
B. FORM AND ENFORCEABILITY OF INSTRUMENTS
One of the essential elements of negotiability is that an instrument
must state a "sum certain in money."'98 Under the pre-1990 Official Text
of the Code, there was a serious question whether this requirement was
met if the instrument contained a variable interest rate.99 In Cartwright v.
MBank Corpus Christi'00 the court held that a variable rate note was ne-
gotiable where it called for the payment of interest at the rate of two
percent above the published prime rate of Corpus Christi National
Bank.'0 1 This result was consistent with the rule announced by the Texas
Supreme Court in answering a certified question from the Fifth Circuit in
Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee,10 2 where the court reasoned that
modernization of commercial law was a stated purpose of the existing
Code and that it was consistent with both the purpose and language of
the current Code to look to the Revised Official Text for guidance on
whether variable rate notes were negotiable. 103 Finding that the Revised
Text expressly provides that variable rate notes are negotiable, 1°4 the
court ruled that such notes would be treated as negotiable under the ex-
isting Code as well so long as the stated rate was publicly available to
interested persons.'0 5
Another interest rate issue addressed during the Survey period was de-
termination of the proper rate to be substituted for the rate charged by a
failed bank. In FDIC v. Massingill'06 the court allowed the substitution
of the prime rate of an assuming bank in place of the "base rate" of the
failed bank which had originally made the loan. 107
Even if it wasn't the most significant case reported during the Survey
period, Carnival Leisure Industries, Ltd. v. Aubin,10 8 was easily the most
entertaining one. To finance what proved to be a disastrous run of gam-
bling luck, the defendant issued drafts totaling $25,000 to a casino in the
98. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994). The
revised Code retains this requirement, but changes the phrasing to "a fixed amount of
money" instead of a "sum certain." Rev. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990).
99. The uncertainty surrounding this requirement is discussed in Ackerman v. FDIC,
930 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1991), where the court certified this question to the Texas Supreme
Court for determination under Texas law.
100. 865 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
101. Id. at 549.
102. 831 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1992).
103. Id. at 796. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994)
states that it is the policy of the Code to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions." Id. at § 1.102(2)(a).
104. See Rev. U.C.C. Official Text § 3-112(b) (1990).
105. 831 S.W.2d at 796-97.
106. 24 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 1994). Massingill also involved a significant statute of limita-
tions issue. That aspect of the case is discussed in the text at note 146, infra.
107. Id. at 780-81.
108. 830 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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Bahamas to pay for chips. The chips were treated as the equivalent of
cash at the casino and could be used to pay for room charges, food, drink,
or entertainment, as well as being used for gambling. After losing the
entire $25,000 in less than two days of gambling, the defendant returned
to Texas. The casino attempted to obtain payment of the drafts directly
from the defendant before presenting them to the defendant's bank for
payment. The defendant refused to pay the drafts and also notified his
bank to stop payment on them. When the drafts were finally presented,
the bank dishonored them and notified the casino that payment had been
stopped. The casino sued for the amount of the drafts.
Following a decision by the Fifth Circuit that Texas public policy barred
enforcement of gambling debts,10 9 the case was remanded to the district
court, resulting in a decision that reads as much like a short story as a
legal opinion. After first describing how the court believed the appellate
court had failed to properly analyze the enforceability of the drafts,110 the
district court noted, however, that it was bound by the law of the case and
that the drafts could not be enforced against the defendant."' The ca-
sino, however, had amended its pleading to allege fraud and equitable
estoppel and this change of theory gave the district court an opening to
find that the debt was enforceable on the independent ground of fraud
because the defendant had made a promise to pay by issuing negotiable
drafts while harboring a secret intention not to perform.112 Finding the
Texas public policy against fraud to outweigh the public policy against
gambling, the court entered judgment against the defendant."13
109. This decision is reported as Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624
(5th Cir. 1991).
110. 830 F. Supp. at 371. A few lines from this portion of the decision give the flavor of
the court's opinion.
[The rule that gambling debts are unenforceable] persists in the face of a
public policy that allows churches, charities, and the state itself to operate
gambling establishments . . . . Asserting a sweeping public policy against
gambling is anachronistic. If there really was a policy, it is totally defunct.
If two people are shooting craps, and one goes $100 into the hole, that debt is
not enforceable at law, [but] negotiating a draft does not create a debt. The
consideration is the medium of exchange received for the draft, whether it is
dollars, Deutsche marks, sea shells, or poker chips.
When cash is given for a check and the cash is gambled and lost, the check is
not tainted by gambling.
Courts that twist the facts or warp the public policy are not persuasive.
[The defendant] did not gamble on credit, and his drafts were not payment
for money he already lost. Under the law of the case doctrine, however, the
taint assigned by the court of appeals to [the defendant's] debt is indelible.
830 F. Supp. at 374-76.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 377.
113. Id. In its conclusion, the court stated, "An anachronistic public policy and mis-
guided case law that forbid legal casinos from lawfully collecting commercial instruments
and the debts arising from them will eventually force collection efforts underground.
While it may save moralistic posturing, it may cost knee-caps." Id. The doubt cast in this
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In the Carnival case, 114 there was no doubt about whether the defend-
ant had signed the drafts in question; the critical issue was whether he
could be held liable on some other theory for the amount of the debt
represented by the drafts. In 626 Joint Venture v. Spinks" 5 it was clear
that the named defendants had not signed.the note in question, but it was
equally clear that they were partners in a joint venture formed for the
purpose of purchasing land. Although the defendants could not be held
liable on the note because their signatures did not appear on the instru-
ment, they could be held liable on the underlying obligation arising from
the agreement of the joint venture partners to purchase the land. 116
In FDIC v. Trans Pacific Industries, Inc." 7 the question was whether a
person had signed two notes in the capacity of a comaker, thus making
him personally liable on the instruments, or whether he had signed only
in a representative capacity, thus avoiding any personal liability at all.
The only name appearing in an identification block in the top left corner
of each note listed the borrower as Trans Pacific Industries. The signa-
ture block in the lower right hand comer, however, contained three
preprinted lines with the printed word "Borrower" appearing at the end
of each line. The lines in the signature block had been filled in with the
typed corporate name on the first line and with the typed name of the
individual on the second line. There were no words appearing before or
after the name of the individual to identify him as an agent or other rep-
resentative. Applying the standard rule of construction that a contract
must be interpreted as a whole, and reading the notes in the light of busi-
ness expectations, the court held that it was "abundantly clear" that the
individual had signed only in a representative capacity and did not incur
personal liability on the notes." 8
In In re Appel" 9 the court considered a different issue of enforceability
by addressing the question: When is a cashier's check not a cashier's
decision about the validity of a continuing policy against gambling was subsequently
echoed in Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. State of Texas, 852 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
114. Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 830 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
115. 873 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
116. Id. at 76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) pro-
vides, "No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon." Official
Comment 1 to this section states, in part, that "The party who does not sign may still be
liable on the original obligation for which the instrument was given." Id. § 3.401 cmt. 1.
Rev. U.C.C. § 3-401(a) (1990) provides a similar rule, but the Official Comment to the
revised section does not mention the possible liability of a party on the underlying
obligation.
117. 14 F.3d 10 (5th Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at 12. In reaching this result, the court applied TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 3.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) to interpret the name appearing in the identification
block in relation to the names appearing on the signature lines. The result may have been
different if the instrument had been a check instead. See Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d 97(Tex. 1976), where the preprinted check form identified the person represented, but the
court nonetheless held the representative signer personally liable for failing to identify his
representative capacity on the signature line. Rev. U.C.C. § 3-402(c) (1990) changes this
result in the check cases and Official Comment 3 to that section specifically notes that it is
intended to overrule Griffin and similar cases.
119. 166 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994).
1995]
SMU LAW REVIEW
check? At the request of a bankruptcy trustee, a bank prepared four
cashier's checks to transfer funds from the bankruptcy debtor's bank ac-
counts to the bankruptcy estate. Before the checks were delivered to the
trustee, however, the bank's attorney advised the bank that its common
law right of setoff was dependent on the continued possession of the
funds. Acting on this sound advice, the bank refused to deliver the cash-
ier's checks to the trustee. The trustee argued that under Texas law a
bank may not dishonor or stop payment on a cashier's check. 120 While
the court agreed with this proposition, it pointed out that the rule does
not apply when the cashier's check has never been issued. 121 The court
entered an order allowing the bank to exercise its common law right of
setoff, thus answering the question posed above by stating, in effect: A
cashier's check is not a cashier's check when it has never been issued. 122
C. HOLDERS IN (AND NOT IN) DUE COURSE
The rights of a holder in due course are dramatically greater than those
of a holder who is not in due course. A holder in due course holds an
instrument free from a wide variety of common defenses while a holder
who is not in due course remains subject to these defenses. 123 Four cases
decided during the Survey period nicely illustrate the difference. 124
120. Id. As to the rule preventing a bank from stopping payment on cashier's checks,
see Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust Co., 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973). A bank
may stop payment, however, when it draws a check against an account maintained at an-
other financial situation instead of on itself. See the combined cases of Guaranty Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Horseshoe Operating Co. and University Say. Ass'n v. Internat'l Consol.
Co., 793 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1990) (bank allowed to stop payment on teller's checks).
121. 166 B.R. at 625. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994) defines "issue" as "the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or remitter." The
1990 revision broadens the definition providing for delivery to "a holder or nonholder"
instead of using the term "remitter," but the effect of the rule remains the same. See UCC
Official Text § 3-105(a) (1990).
122. 166 B.R. at 626. Rev. U.C.C. § 3-105(a) (1990) (UCC) seems to treat this question
somewhat differently by stating that "An unissued instrument ... is binding on the maker
or drawer, but nonissuance is a defense." Under the revised Code, a cashier's check may
be a cashier's check as soon as it is written, even though it may have been written in error
and destroyed immediately thereafter. While the nonissuance can be raised as a defense,
this is not the same as determining whether payment can be stopped on the instrument.
123. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) on
the rights of a holder in due course with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994) on the rights of a holder who is not in due course. The revised Code contin-
ues this dichotomy. See Rev. U.C.C. Official Text § 3-305(a) & (b) (1990) which restates
the respective rights in a single section, but does not change the substance. Examples of
defenses which may be asserted against a holder who is not in due course, but which are
cut off by a holder in due course, include failure of consideration, breach of contract, fraud
in the inducement, and non-performance of conditions precedent. Certain defenses of
public concern or of an egregious nature remain good even against a holder in due course.
Examples of these defenses include infancy of the obligor, duress, lack of legal capacity, or
illegality of the transaction.
124. Burns v. RTC, 880 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.);
Trueheart v. Braselton, 875 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.); Cadle
Co. v. Bankston & Lobingier, 868 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ re-
quested) and Hou-Tex Printers, Inc. v. Marbach, 862 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
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In Burns v. RTC125 the Resolution Trust Corporation acquired several
notes from a failed bank. The defendant maker asserted breach of con-
tract defenses arising from his failure to receive notice of sale when the
bank foreclosed on the notes and conducted a sale of the collateral secur-
ing the notes. The court held that, in the RTC's capacity as a holder in
due course of the notes, these defenses were unavailing. 126 The court
further held, however, that the RTC itself had the burden of proving the
amount of the debt, the sale price of the collateral, and the resulting defi-
ciency. 127 Having the status of a holder in due course does not relieve a
holder from complying with his or her own obligations in regard to an
instrument; it merely allows freedom from claims and defenses arising
before the holder's acquisition of the instrument. 128 Failure to establish
the amount of the deficiency prevented the RTC from recovering on the
notes.129
In Cadle Co. v. Bankston & Lobingier130 the holder not only failed to
show that it was a holder in due course, but also breached a separate
agreement with the maker entered into after the holder had acquired the
note. Under these circumstances, the holder remained subject to the
maker's defenses of setoff and tender of payment to a prior holder, thus
preventing recovery on the note.' 3 ' In addition, because of the failure to
fulfill its own agreement with the maker to withdraw an adverse credit
report the holder had filed with a credit reporting agency, the court held
the maker was entitled to recover damages for injury to his credit and
credit reputation. 32
In Trueheart v. Braselton133 the holder also failed to qualify as a holder
in due course and was subject to a defense of setoff and a defense of
failure of an oral condition precedent arising out of the maker's dealings
with a prior holder.134 In Hou-Tex Printers, Inc. v. Marbach135 the plain-
tiff purchasers of a note failed to establish that they rose to the status of a
holder, much less to the status of a holder in due course, because of their
125. 880 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
126. Id at 154. The RTC had qualified as a holder in due course under the federal
holder in due course doctrine which permits the FDIC and the RTC to acquire holder in
due course status without meeting the technical requirements of state law. See FDIC v.
Payne, 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992). The rights of a holder in due course under this
doctrine parallel those existing under the Code except for the manner of acquisition.
127. Id.
128. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.302 & 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) pro-
vide that a holder in due course takes an instrument free from various claims and defenses.
It does not insulate the holder from defenses arising from the holder's own acts.
129. 880 S.W.2d 149 at 156.
130. 868 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
131. Id. at 922.
132. Id. at 924.
133. 875 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
134. I at 415.
135. 862 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
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failure to establish proof of ownership. 136 Summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs was reversed. 137
D. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
In Lyco Acquisition 1984 v. First National Bank of Amarillo138 an oil
royalty interest owner sued a well operator for failure to make royalty
payments. During the course of this litigation, the interest owner learned
that the well operator had in fact issued twenty-five checks naming the
interest owner as payee, but the payee's name had been forged on all of
the checks before they were delivered to the payee and the funds had
been paid by the drawee bank to persons who converted the money to
their own use. The checks had been paid on March 10, 1986, but the
payee did not learn of the conversion until April 30, 1991. A few days
later, the payee sued the drawee bank for conversion.
The bank asserted two defenses. First, that the conversion claim was
barred by a two-year limitations period and, second, that the payee could
not maintain a cause of action for conversion because the checks had
never been delivered to the payee. The court held that, absent fraudulent
concealment by the bank, a conversion claim based on a forged indorse-
ment accrues when the instrument is paid.1 39 Because the payee failed to
commence an action against the bank by March 10, 1988, and because
there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment, the court held the con-
version claim was barred. 140 This holding made it unnecessary for the
court to reach the second defense raised by the bank that the checks had
never been delivered to the payee.141
A different limitations issue arose in Cadle Co. v. Matheson,142 where
the court withdrew its previous decision holding that a transferee from
136. Id. at 191-92. Proof of ownership may be established by offering either the origi-
nal of the note showing a proper sequence of indorsements or by offering a sworn copy of a
note together with an affidavit of ownership. Zarges v. Bevan, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.
1983). The plaintiffs in Hou-Tex did neither.
137. 862 S.W.2d at 191.
138. 860 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
139. Id. at 119.
140. Id. The court applied the 2-year limitations period found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
141. 860 S.W.2d at 119. The current version of Article 3 in Texas does not state a limi-
tations period for conversion actions and TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1994) is silent on the question of whether non-delivery is a defense to a
payee's action for conversion. The revised Article 3 states a three-year limitations period
in Rev. U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (1990) and, noting a split of authority on the non-delivery issue,
specifically provides that "An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought
by ... a payee or indorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or
through delivery to an agent or a co-payee." Rev. U.C.C. § 3-420(c) & cmt. 1 (1990).
There appear to be no Texas cases in point on the non-delivery issue under the Code but,
with this lack of caselaw and the failure of the existing Code to address the issue, the
revised Code may well be a persuasive interpretive source if this issue is litigated in an-
other case prior to adoption of the revision. See the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court
in Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 -S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1992), discussed in
the text at note 102, supra.
142. 870 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
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the federal agency appointed as receiver of a failed bank was limited to
the four-year state limitations period.143 On rehearing, the court applied
the holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Jackson v. Thweatt,'" that the
transferee from a federal banking receiver obtains the benefit of the six-
year federal limitations period. 145
In FDIC v. Massingill146 there was no doubt that the federal limitations
period applied because the action was brought by the FDIC. The critical
question, however, was whether an invalid .attempt to accelerate a note
triggered the beginning of the six-year period. If it did, the FDIC action
was time-barred; if it did not, the action was still timely. On two separate
grounds, the court concluded that the action was not barred.
First, contrary to Texas law, the creditor failed to give notice of an in-
tent to accelerate and only gave a notice of acceleration instead.
147
Although the note signed by the debtor contained a provision waiving
"notice," the court held the waiver was not effective because it did not
specify the notices being waived as required under Texas law. 48 Since
the attempt to accelerate was ineffective, no cause of action accrued to
the creditor that would commence the running of the statute of limita-
tions. The inquiry did not end here, however, because there was a serious
conflict of law issue as to whether Texas law or New Mexico law applied
to the case. Under the law of New Mexico, the attempt to accelerate
appeared to be proper and a cause of action may have accrued.' 49 Be-
cause of this possibility the court discussed another basis for holding the
action was not time-barred.
This second basis turned on the creditor's failure to pursue any legal
rights it may have had even if the acceleration had been proper under the
laws of both Texas and New Mexico. After the attempted acceleration,
one of the two notes in question was renewed and no action was pursued
to enforce any claim based on the purported acceleration of the other
note. The court characterized this as "the lack of affirmative action nec-
essary for a valid acceleration pursuant to Texas law"'150 and as an "aban-
143. The four-year limitations period is stated in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
144. 883 S.W.2d 171, cert. denied sub nom. Weatherly v. Federal Debt Mgmt., Inc., 115
S. Ct. 196 (1994).
145. Id. at 174. The federal limitations period is stated in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)
(Supp. 1 1989).
146. 24 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 1994).
147. Unless waived, Texas law requires a notice of intent to accelerate followed by a
notice of the acceleration itself. Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex.
1982). Rights to receive these notices can be waived by a debtor if the waiver clearly and
separately states the rights being waived. Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d
890, 893 (Tex. 1991).
148. 24 F.3d at 776-77. The waiver standards are those stated in Shumway v. Horizon
Credit Corp. cited in the preceding footnote.
149. Id. at 777-78.
150. Id. at 776.
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donment or waiver"'151 under the law likely to be applied in New
Mexico. 152
E. CONTRACrs OF GUARANTY
Contracts of guaranty may arise as part of the obligation of a party who
has signed an instrument as a guarantor under the Code or as separate
contracts between a guarantor and a creditor outside the Code. Guar-
anty contracts created by the form of an indorsement under Article 3 of
the Code fall into two categories: guaranties of collection and guaranties
of payment.153 The contracts are created simply by adding the words
"Collection guaranteed" or "Payment guaranteed" to an indorsement. 154
The terms of such "short-form" guaranties are, in effect, provided by stat-
ute instead of being stated in a more elaborate agreement between the
parties. Guaranty contracts created outside the Code not only contain
words of guaranty, but also frequently contain provisions waiving pre-
sentment and notices of default and acceleration, terms specifying the
amount or the scope of the guarantor's obligation, and limitations on the
discharge of a guarantor arising from the release of other parties or from
the impairment of collateral.
Terms contained in separate guaranty agreements figured in four cases
decided during the Survey period. 155 In Sonne v. FDIC56 and in Mar-
shall v. Ford Motor Co.157 the issue concerned the scope of the guaran-
ties. In Sonne the court held that the guaranty was a continuing guaranty
151. Id at 778.
152. The court found no New Mexico cases directly addressing the abandonment or
waiver issue and interpolated this as the likely result in New Mexico based on the "domi-
nant trend" among the states to allow abandonment or waiver of claims based on an accel-
eration. 24 F.3d at 778.
153. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.415 & 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
The revised Code combines these provisions into a single section and makes a significant
substantive change by eliminating the category of guaranties of payment. Rev. U.C.C. § 3-
419 (1990). A Commentary by the Uniform Commercial Code Permanent Editorial Board
notes the change, but offers no explanation for it. PEB Commentary No. 11, 6-7 (1994).
The same section in the revised Code also omits the prior rule in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.416(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) that words of guaranty waive presentment,
notice of dishonor, and protest. It is uncertain whether these changes would overturn the
result in such cases as Ferguson v. McCarrell, 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979) (liability of guar-
antor of payment indistinguishable from that of a maker) and Universal Metals & Machin-
ery, Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976) (guarantors of payment are primary
obligors and waive the requirement that the holder first proceed against the maker as a
condition precedent to liability) or merely cause the rules surrounding guaranties of pay-
ment to become a matter of common law outside the Code, since such guaranties are not
prohibited by Rev. U.C.C. § 3-420 (1990); they are simply not provided for.
154. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) & (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994). If
only the word "Guaranteed" is used, or if the words do not otherwise specify, the guaranty
is a guaranty of payment. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994).
155. Sonne v. FDIC, 881 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ re-
quested); Peoples State Bank of Clyde v. Andrews, 881 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.- Eastland
1994, n.w.h.); Wiman v. Tomaszewicz, 877 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.) and
Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 878 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
156. 881 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
157. 878 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
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that made the guarantors liable for additional amounts loaned to the
principal obligor after the original guaranty contracts were signed.' 58 The
court rejected an argument that a handwritten change in the amount of
the note evidencing the guaranteed debt was a material alteration that
discharged the guarantors, because the guarantors had consented to pay-
ment of any increased obligations incurred by the principal debtor re-
gardless of how the creditor and the debtor may have agreed on such
amounts.15 9 In Marshall v. Ford Motor Co.160 the guarantors were more
fortunate. The guaranty in question guaranteed payment for goods sold
by Ford Marketing Corporation to the principal debtor. After the guar-
anty was signed, Ford Marketing Corporation was merged into Ford Mo-
tor Company and subsequent sales of goods took place through Ford
Motor Company. The court held that the guarantors were not liable for
such sales because the guaranty did not specify it covered sales by any
entity other than Ford Marketing Corporation and the guarantors were
entitled to insist that the terms of their guaranty be strictly followed.' 6 '
In Peoples State Bank of Clyde v. Andrews' 62 and in Wiman v. Tomas-
zewicz 163 the issue concerned the ability of a guarantor to assert claims or
defenses of the principal obligor against the obligee. In Peoples State
Bank the guarantor argued that a demand letter sent to him by the obli-
gee made him an obligor and permitted him to recover usury penalties
against the obligee. The court held that the right to recover penalties for
usury is personal to the principal debtor and, since the guarantor was not
an immediate party to the loan transaction, he was not entitled to a pen-
alty award. 164 In Wiman the guarantor contended that the statute of limi-
tations began to run against him when the creditor made a demand for
payment on the principal debtor. The court held that the guaranty was a
guaranty of payment allowing the creditor to proceed directly against the
guarantor without first resorting to the principal debtor.165 However, the
guaranty conditioned any claim against the guarantor upon a written de-
mand for payment from the creditor directed to the guarantor. The court
reasoned that, under such a guaranty, the limitations period begins to run
against the guarantor only when demand is made to the guarantor for
payment of the debt. 166 Since a demand was not directed to the guaran-
tor until some three weeks after demand for payment was made on the
principal debtor, an action against the guarantor that was brought one
158. 881 S.W.2d at 793.
159. Id. at 792.
160. 878 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
161. Id. at 631. In reaching this result, the court cited FDIC v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939,
944 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), for the proposition that contracts of
guaranty are to be strictly construed.
162. 881 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.- Eastland 1994, n.w.h.).
163. 877 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
164. 881 S.W.2d at 522. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had previously
held that usury is a personal defense of the debtor in Houston Sash and Door Co. v. He-
aner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979).




day short of the four-year limitations period was not time-barred, even
though an action against the principal debtor would have been barred by
that same date. 167
IV. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PAYOR BANK AND ITS CUSTOMER
Perhaps the most important case decided during the Survey period was
First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc.168 In that case the Texas
Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that service fees charged by a
bank for the payment of overdrafts are not interest and, therefore, cannot
be the grounds for a usury claim.169 Between April and December of
1984, Tony's Tortilla Factory wrote 2,165 checks creating overdrafts in its
checking accounts. The bank charged a total of $47,600.00 in service fees
for paying these overdrafts and the customers sued the bank on a variety
of claims, including a claim for alleged usury resulting from the charges
assessed for paying the overdrafts. The court of appeals held there was
sufficient evidence on the usury claim to go to the jury on the question of
whether the overcharge fees constituted interest on the amounts paid out
by the bank on the overdrafts. 170 On appeal by the bank, the supreme
court reversed and rendered judgment against the plaintiffs on their claim
of usury, noting the overdraft charges were processing fees assessed for
handling the insufficient fund checks.171 Because the bank had the au-
thority to pay the checks even if they created overdrafts under section
4.401 of the Code, the consideration for such payment was the implied
promise by the customer to repay the amount of such overdrafts.172 Be-
cause this was a separate consideration from the consideration paid for
processing the insufficient fund checks, the court ruled the fees could not
be usurious.173
Section 4.406 of the Code allows a customer one year to report a for-
gery drawn against the customer's account.174 This time limit may be va-
167. Id. The court also rejected an argument that this result exposed the guarantor to a
greater liability than that of the principal obligor because the guarantor had lost the right
of recourse against the obligor. The court pointed out that the guarantor has an independ-
ent cause of action against the obligor to recover for the amount paid by the guarantor and
that the limitations period on this cause of action does not begin to run until the guarantor
makes payment. Id. at 6-7.
168. 877 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1994).
169. Id. at 285.
170. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. First Bank, 857 S.W.2d 580 at 587 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1994).
171. 877 S.W.2d at 288.
172. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) allows a
bank to charge a customer's account even if the charge creates an overdraft. The revised
Code continues this rule. Rev. U.C.C. § 4-401 (a) (1990). The revision also explicitly pro-
vides that a customer is not liable for the amount of an overdraft if the customer did not
sign the item in question or did not benefit from the proceeds of the item. Rev. U.C.C.
§ 4-401(b) (1990). A similar rule has already been adopted in Texas by case decision. See
Williams v. Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust, 685 S.W.2d 311 at 315 (Tex. 1985).
173. 877 S.W.2d at 288.
174. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
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ried by agreement under section 4.103 .of the Code so long as the
agreement does not disclaim the bank's responsibility to act in good faith
or its failure to exercise ordinary care.175 In Tumlinson v. First Victoria
National Bank176 some forty-five checks ranging from five hundred to
one thousand dollars were forged against the customers' account during
the course of a one-year period. When the forgeries came to light, the
bank asserted a sixty-day limitation period contained in the deposit
agreement. 77 The court held that claims for any forged checks paid by
the bank more than sixty days before the customers received their bank
statement and notified the bank of such forgeries were barred by the
agreement between the customers and the bank. 178 Claims for forgeries
occurring within the sixty-day time period might be valid under section
4.406 of the Code if the customers could show that the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care in paying the forged items. 79
B. JOINT AccouNTs
Joint bank accounts have been a continuing source of litigation in
Texas. 180 To remedy some of the confusion surrounding such accounts,
and to protect financial institutions from allegations that an account was
not properly established by a signature card or other deposit agreement,
the legislature added a statutory account form to the Texas Probate Code
in 1993.181 Accounts that came into existence prior to the adoption of the
statutory form and which have not been updated by having the customers
complete a new form will continue to generate interpretive difficulties as
175. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
176. 865 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
177. Uncontroverted testimony by a bank officer showed that bank statements of ac-
count were mailed to all customers on a monthly basis. Id. at 178.
178. Id at 178.
179. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) does not
preclude a customer from asserting a claim for improper payment of a forged item by the
same wrongdoer if the customer is able to show that the bank failed to exercise ordinary
care in paying the item. Curiously enough, the court never mentions whether the 45 for-
geries were by the same person. Under the present Code, the bank may have been able to
assert a 14-day limit if the forgeries had been by the same wrongdoer, but this time limit
did not figure in the case. The revised Code changes the 14-day time limit to 30 days on
forgeries by the same wrongdoer. Rev. U.C.C. § 4-406(d)(2) (1990). This is a strange case
that seems to leave several loose ends.
180. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990) (language in signature
card held insufficient to create right of survivorship); Cecil v. Smith, 821 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.
App.-yler 1991, no writ) (dispute regarding ownership of funds evidenced by a certifi-
cate of deposit); Dickerson v. Brooks, 727 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e) (statement on signature card that account was held by parties as joint
tenants with right of survivorship held sufficient); Chopin v. InterFirst Bank Dallas, 694
S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (to vest ownership in surviving party
a joint account must state that the account is held by the parties as joint tenants with right
of survivorship); Leinert v, Sabine Nat'l Bank, 541 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (right of parties to control funds in joint account held in the names
of "A or B" as contrasted to the control of funds held in the names of "A and B").
181. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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evidenced by McNeme v. Estate of Hart82 and Banks v. Browning.183
Accounts at two different banks were involved in McNeme. The court
initially held that the account at one bank had used appropriate language
on the signature card to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
but the account at the other bank failed to create a survivorship right
because there was only a signature card bearing the depositors' initials
and no signed agreement creating such a right.184 On rehearing, how-
ever, the court reversed its decision in regard to the initialed signature
card because the signature card incorporated by reference a deposit
agreement that did contain language creating a right of survivorship. 185
The court held that the signature card and the deposit agreement, taken
together, were sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a written agree-
ment creating a right of survivorship in a joint account. 186 In Banks the
court held that the decedent's signature on an account form containing a
typewritten "X" in a box located beside a paragraph designating the ac-
count as a joint account with a right of survivorship was sufficient to cre-
ate a right of survivorship. 187 The court rejected an argument that proof
was required to show that the typewritten "X" was placed on the card
with the knowledge and consent of the decedent.188
In Regency Financial Corp. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.189 the dispute
centered on whether funds were improperly disbursed from a bank ac-
count by means of a check signed by only one of the two account holders.
Although this issue involved the disbursement of funds from a bank ac-
count rather than the right of joint payees to enforce an instrument, the
court was persuaded that the designation of payees as "A and B" or "A
or B" was equally applicable to an account.1 90 Because the defendant
joint owner failed to show whether the account was an "and" account or
an "or" account, summary judgment in favor of the defendant was re-
versed and the case was remanded for determination of this fact issue.' 91
C. SETOFF
The right of setoff gives a bank some special protection to recover
funds owed by a debtor but, at the same time, it can involve some special
risks. This duality means that a bank must be constantly on the alert to
factors that may invalidate a setoff or that may expose it to greater liabil-
ity than the setoff is worth. One of the basic requirements of a proper
setoff is that the funds used for the setoff actually belong to the debtor. In
182. 860 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
183. 873 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
184. 860 S.W.2d 536 at 539.
185. Id at 540.
186. Id. at 541.
187. 873 S.W.2d 763 at 765.
188. Id.
189. 879 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ ref'd).
190. Id. at 183-84.
191. Id. at 184.
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Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank' 92 the bank guessed correctly that an account
denominated as a trust account was actually a revocable gift that re-
mained under the control of the settlors, and were general funds available
to the settlors at their discretion and subject to a right of setoff for debts
owing from the settlors to the bank.193 In contrast to Soto, the bank
guessed wrongly in Mauriceville Nat. Bank v. Zernial,194 where the court
determined that the evidence clearly showed that a bank had sufficient
information to know that the funds in an account were held by a general
contractor in the nature of a trust to pay subcontractors and materialmen,
and that a setoff against these funds was wrongful. 95 The bank was not
only held liable for the amount of twelve thousand dollars in actual dam-
ages resulting from the setoff, but also for punitive damages of two hun-
dred thousand dollars. 196 In reaching its decision about punitive
damages, the court noted that the bank had chosen to "Razoo" the ac-
count, meaning to " 'grab all you can, as quick as you can.' ",197
A proper setoff also requires that the debt owing from the debtor must
be in default. The events of default may be defined in the loan docu-
ments, but a default there must be. In Boyd v. American Bank of Com-
merce at Wolfforth,198 a bank setoff the amount of a loan against its
customer's checking account, causing several checks written by the cus-
tomer to be dishonored. In an action against the bank for wrongful dis-
honor and for wrongful setoff, the bank defended on the ground that the
notes signed by the customer waived any claims against the bank arising
from a setoff. The court held that, while the waiver might be effective
192. 868 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
193. Id. at 404.
194. 880 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ requested).
195. Id. at 287-88.
196. Id. at 292.
197. Id. at 291, n. 1. In the footnote, the court described the word, "Razoo" in the
following terms:
"Razoo" is a "real" word meaning: with influence of razzle-dazzle ... WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNA-rIONAL DICriONARY 2069 (2nd ed. 1936). "Razoo" was
also used colloquially, meaning, "grab all you can, as quick as you can." The
word was commonly used by marble playing youngsters in the 1940's and
50's. During this era, playing the game of marbles "for keeps" was morally
unacceptable, for such constituted a form of gambling or gaming. To be
caught playing marbles "for keeps" on school campus, subjected the catchee
or catchees to corporal punishment. Nevertheless, certain youngsters, from
time to time, would run the risk of punishment by indulging in this morally
improper activity. In so doing, a virtually fail-safe warning system was de-
vised. One or more youngsters were designated "lookouts," whose sole func-
tion was to sound the alert should a teacher or principal approach the area.
Rather than yelling, "the teacher/principal is coming," the "lookout" would
simply yell, "Razoo" thus, was born the "Razoo Rule." The word "Razoo,"
immediately triggered an unwritten legal concept known as "absolute and
unquestioned ownership" of all the marbles which could be grabbed by any
of the players. The fairness of the "Razoo Rule" was derived from the fact
that all players "agreed" to the rule.
Whether the "Razoo Rule" was recognized nationally, the writer knoweth not, however,
the rule was of common understanding at Pine Grove Elementary School, Newton County,
Texas.
198. 872 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
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against claims arising from a proper setoff, nothing in the notes purported
to waive the need for a default before a setoff was exercised. 199 As stated
by the court, "[W]ithout an authorized offset, [the plaintiff's] waiver of
the bank's liability for the offset is of no moment at this stage of the
proceedings. '20 0 Summary judgment in favor of the bank was reversed.201
Even if a setoff is exercised after a debt has matured against funds in an
account that are not denominated as trust funds or the like, the creditor
may be required to return the funds upon learning that the funds were
actually being held for the benefit of another person. This rule is gener-
ally termed the "equitable setoff" or "federal setoff" rule and was
adopted in Texas in the case of National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch
State Bank.202 The rule was most recently applied in FDIC v. Golden
Imports, Inc.2 03 where a bank holding a perfected security interest in in-
ventory, proceeds of inventory, and deposit accounts "setoff" a defaulted
loan against the funds in the debtor's business account. After exercising
the setoff, the bank learned that some of the funds in the account had
been received from a customer to pay for an automobile purchased by
the customer in a "brokerage transaction" and were to be remitted to the
seller of the automobile.2°4 The bank refused to return any of the funds
and the debtor sued for conversion. Applying the equitable setoff rule,
the court held that, even though the setoff may have been innocent at the
time is was exercised, the bank had a duty to return the affected funds
when it learned they were being held for the benefit of another person.20 5
An award of punitive damages was reversed, however, because the FDIC
had intervened in the action following the failure of the lending bank and
punitive damages are not recoverable against the FDIC.2°6
Although presently only a lower court opinion with minimal preceden-
tial weight, the decision in FDIC v. Perry Bros. 20 7 makes fascinating read-
ing and may influence future decisions about the procedure to be
followed by a bank in exercising a right of setoff. After reviewing and
discussing a complex set of facts and multiple legal claims arising out of a
long-term lending arrangement between the debtor, a failed bank, the
FDIC, and an assuming bank, the court concluded that the assuming
bank had improperly setoff against the debtor's account and, more impor-
tantly, had this to say about the setoff procedure generally:
199. Id. at 32.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 348 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. 1961).
203. 859 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
204. Under the terms of the security agreement with the bank, brokered cars were not
treated as part of the debtor's inventory. The debtor's only function in regard to these cars
was to receive orders from prospective purchasers, to locate a car that met the purchaser's
requirements, and to make arrangements for delivery and payment between the purchaser
and the seller. Id. at 643.
205. Id. at 641.
206. Id. at 648.
207. 854 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
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The Court's review of authorities reveals that beyond the debt ma-
turity requirement, several procedural steps are necessary to the
proper exercise of the bank's self-help setoff right: (a) the decision
by the bank to exercise the right; (b) some action that accomplishes
the setoff; (c) some record which evidences that the right of setoff
has been exercised; and (d) in light of the essentially governmental
(judicial) nature of a bank's setoff action, it is clear that at least con-
temporaneous notice of such a setoff to the depositor is necessary in
order for the bank to avoid violating the depositor's rights under due
process and/or the federal common law.20 8
The court went on to explain that the notice need not be extensive or
formal, but that a bank must make at least a good faith attempt to con-
temporaneously advise the debtor that a setoff was being exercised.
209
Placing a right to notice on a constitutional or federal common law due
process ground adds yet another element to the difficulties a bank faces
in exercising what began as a "simple" process to obtain payment of a
debt.
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Article 9 of the Code draws a sharp distinction between the rights ac-
corded to an unperfected security interest and a perfected security inter-
est.210 Section 9.302 describes the proper method for initially perfecting a
security interest in various types of collateral 211 Although a security in-
terest may have been properly perfected in the first instance, it may lose
that status by a change in the nature of the collateral, 212 or by interstate
movement of the collateral, 213 or even by the mere passage of time.
214
A novel question regarding the continuation of perfection arose in
Giese v. NCNB Tex. Forney Banking Center.215 In what the court denom-
inated a "case of first impression," 216 an individual purchased a double-
wide mobile home and obtained a "clean" certificate of title to the
208. Id. at 1269.
209. Id. at 1272.
210. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) provides that an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to a number of other claimants listed in
§ 9.301(a)(1)-(4). In contrast, a perfected security interest has priority over those same
claimants.
211. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
212. For example, the original collateral may be sold and the proceeds used to purchase
a type of collateral not described in the original financing statement used to perfect the
security interest. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991).
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) states a variety
of circumstances in which a security interest properly perfected in one state loses perfected
status after the collateral is moved to another state.
214. The simplest example of such loss of perfected status is the rule stated in TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) that a filed financing statement
ceases to be effective after 5 years unless a continuation statement is filed.
215. 881 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
216. Id. at 778.
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home.217 She permanently affixed it to a lot she already owned and ad-
ded various improvements such as a porch, a deck, and plumbing and
electrical systems. Three years later she sold the home and lot to a hus-
band and wife and financed the sale herself. To secure the loan she filed
a deed of trust and a financing statement in the county real estate
records. She also delivered the "clean" certificate of title to the purchas-
ers. The purchasers subsequently borrowed money from a bank and used
the mobile home as collateral. The bank's security interest was noted on
the certificate of title. Following a default by the purchasers on both
loans, the bank foreclosed on the mobile home and the financing seller
claimed a superior interest.
The court ruled that the seller's attempt to perfect a lien in the mobile
home by filing in the real estate records was ineffective so long as a certif-
icate of title on the home was outstanding.218 According to the court, the
proper method to perfect a security interest in a mobile home when a
certificate of title exists that covers the home is by notation on the certifi-
cate, whether or not the mobile home is affixed to realty. 219 Recording in
the real property records is the proper method of perfection only if the
certificate of title is surrendered and canceled by the issuing authority.220
The court held that the Bank had the only perfected interest and was
entitled to priority in the mobile home.221
The issue in White v. FDIC222 centered on whether the relative priority
rights of claimants to an interpleader fund are frozen in the position they
had when the interpleader was commenced or whether subsequent events
could change the respective rights of the various claimants. This question
can arise in different contexts, but the basic issue remains the same. For
example, the claim of one party may be based on a security interest that is
perfected when the interpleader is filed, but the security interest becomes
unperfected while the interpleader is still pending. Alternatively, one
claimant may take steps after an interpleader is filed that gives that claim-
ant greater rights than the claimant had when the interpleader was filed.
In White the court noted that the Second Circuit had previously decided a
case arising on the former set of facts, but the case before it concerned
217. Id. at 778. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)
provides that the proper method of perfecting a security interest in goods covered by a
certificate of title is by compliance with the certificate of title statute. Certificates of title to
manufactured homes, including mobile homes, are required by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5221f, § 19 (Vernon 1991). The Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation is re-
sponsible for issuing certificates of title for manufactured homes and for the notation of
security interests on such certificates. A "clean" certificate of title is one on which no
security interests are noted. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 cmt. 4(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1991).
218. Id. at 781.
219. Id.
220. lit The court noted: "When perfection is attempted in the manner described in
this case, there is an original certificate of title outstanding that does not reflect any liens
against the property... Had the title been canceled, the Bank would have been put on
notice that it needed to investigate further." Id. at 781.
221. 881 S.W.2d at 781.
222. 19 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the latter situation.22 3 Despite the factual difference between the two
cases, the court held that the rationale used by the Second Circuit was
"clearly applicable. ' 224 The court reasoned that once an interpleader is
filed, the property passes into the custody of the court and "absent ex-
traordinary circumstances," the court should determine the rights of the
parties as they existed when the interpleader was filed.225
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 eliminated one difficulty facing
holders of purchase money security interests by changing the time period
allowed under the Bankruptcy Code for the perfection of purchase
money interests from ten days to twenty days.226 This change avoids an
inconsistency between federal law, which allowed a ten-day time period
to perfect such interests, and state law, which allowed a twenty-day time
period.227 This change overrules the decision in In re Hamilton,2 28 which
held that a bankruptcy trustee could avoid a purchase money security
interest as a preferential transfer when that interest was perfected more
than ten days after it attached because the ten-day period stated in the
Bankruptcy Code preempted the twenty-day period allowed by state
law.229 Other courts disagreed with the preemption doctrine as applied in
Hamilton, but this disagreement has been obviated by the amendment of
the Bankruptcy Code.230
223. Id. at 251-52 The prior decision was Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 853
F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1988).
224. 19 F.3d at 252.
225. Id. at 253. A similar issue arises when a debtor files a petition in bankruptcy and a
security interest that was perfected at the commencement of the bankruptcy becomes un-
perfected during the course of the insolvency proceedings. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) addresses this situation if the security interest was
originally perfected by a filing that lapses during the bankruptcy, but it does not cover
cases where the security interest is perfected by some other method, such as the four-
month period of perfection provided in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(a)(4)(i)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). A secured party is well-advised to make any necessary filing to
continue perfection for security interests not protected by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 recognized
the need to provide secured parties with this ability by allowing continuation statements
and similar filings to be made during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding without
violating the automatic stay. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 204,
108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3)).
226. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 203, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B)). A conforming change was made in § 547(e)(2)(A).
227. Until passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B)
(1986) allowed only 10 days for the delayed perfection of a purchase money security inter-
est while TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) allowed 20
days.
228. 892 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1990).
229. The security interest in In re Hamilton was perfected by notation on a certificate of
title eleven days after attachment, thus missing the 10 day period allowed by the Bank-
ruptcy Code by a single day.
230. Cases rejecting application of the preemption doctrine to the perfection of
purchase money security interests include In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1993)(Bankruptcy Code incorporates effective date of perfection under state law) and In re
Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1990) (Bankruptcy Code allows perfection within
time permitted by state law), cert. denied sub nom. Moister v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 500 U.S. 949 (1991)).
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B. RIGHTS OF PARTIES FOLLOWING DEFAULT
Once a default occurs under a security agreement, a secured party is
entitled to take possession and dispose of the collateral and seek a recov-
ery against the debtor for any deficiency.23' One of the most common
difficulties faced by secured creditors is the disposition of collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner as required in section 9.504 of the
Code, including giving notice of any sale of collateral to the debtor.232
One way to avoid this difficulty is by obtaining a waiver from the debtor,
but the right to a commercially reasonable disposition cannot be
waived, 233 and a waiver of the right to notice of a sale of collateral is
effective only if it is signed by the debtor after default.2 34 In Steinberg v.
Cinema N' Drafthouse Systems, Inc. 235 the court addressed the question
of whether the limitation on the ability of a debtor to waive rights to a
commercially reasonable disposition of collateral extended to guarantors
as well as debtors. The court noted that "[n]o Texas case has answered
this precise question," 236 but its review of Texas authority on related is-
sues convinced the court that the Texas Supreme Court would hold that
the prohibition on waiver would not be applied to guarantors. 237
If the collateral consists of accounts, chattel paper, or instruments, a
secured party does not face the same restrictions in dealing with the col-
lateral after default. Section 9.502 of the Code permits a secured party
with a security interest in such collateral to make direct collections from
the persons obligated on the collateral (the "account debtors") without
notice to the debtor.238 In Bray v. Cadle Co. 239 the court applied section
9.502 to hold that a secured creditor was entitled to collect the amount
owed on a note pledged as security for a loan from the account debtor.240
The court reached this result even though the original note had appar-
ently been lost and could not be produced by the secured party. On the
evidence in the record, the court concluded that ownership of the note
was sufficiently established to permit collection by the secured party de-
spite the absence of the original.241
The problems confronting a secured party who is unable to avoid the
strictures of section 9.504 were illustrated in Gordon & Assoc. v. Cullen
Bank/Citywest242 which contains a litany of the ways in which a secured
party failed to carry the burden of proving that it disposed of collateral in
231. These rights of a secured party appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.501-
9.505 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
232. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
233. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(c)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
234. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
235. 28 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 1994).
236. Id. at 25.
237. Id.
238. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.502 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
239. 880 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
240. Id. at 816.
241. Id. at 818.
242. 880 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
1004 [Vol. 48
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
a commercially reasonable manner. 243 The defects noted by the court in-
cluded a failure to show proper advertising of the sale when the record
indicated the sale had been advertised as a private sale, but the collateral
was subsequently sold at public sale;2 "4 a failure to account for and ex-
plain the expenses allegedly associated with the sale;245 a failure to ac-
count to the debtor for the proceeds of the sale;246 and a failure to show
that the purported sale was not actually a retention of the collateral by
the creditor in full satisfaction of the debt.247 The court held the secured
party was not entitled to a summary judgment in its deficiency action and
remanded the case to the trial court.248
243. Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Tex. 1992)
placed the burden of proving the commercially reasonable disposition of collateral on the
secured party.
244. 880 S.W.2d at 97.
245. Id. at 97-98.
246. Id. at 98.
247. Id. The court noted that an election to retain collateral in satisfaction of a debt
may result from the actions of the secured party and bar the recovery of a deficiency under
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
248. 880 S.W.2d at 98.
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